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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of technology and its role in acts of terror, specifically the attacks
in Paris on November 13, 2015, have reopened a longstanding debate on how
state governments should regulate internet usage.1 As accessibility to
technology increases, a complicated question arises: what is the proper method
for governments to legislate the balance between national security and
personal freedom when it comes to the internet? The French government
recently reacted to the killing of political cartoonists with a new law that
regulates and collects data on French citizens.2 This Note will analyze whether
the Loi Relative au Renseignement (Law Concerning Intelligence) infringes on
basic rights guaranteed in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
(ECFR), beyond what is permitted under the margin of appreciation doctrine,
so as to violate France’s requirements under the ECFR.
Part One of this Note will examine the creation, implementation, and
potential consequences of the Loi Relative au Renseignement, providing
context to better understand the content of this law and how it will affect the
lives of people using the internet in France. Part Two will discuss the ECFR
and its relevance to the controversy. The most applicable rights to this
discussion are an individual’s right to private and family life and the right to
protection of personal data, found in Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR.3 As a
member of the European Union, France is bound by the rules of the
community and is subject to the rulings of the European Courts. Part Three
will analyze how the European Court of Justice, the highest European Union
court, should rule on the validity of this law based on the text of the Articles,
jurisprudence, and legislative history of the ECFR. The European Charter of
Fundamental Rights establishes all of the fundamental rights protected in the
European Union. If the European Commission should decide to bring France
to the European Court of Justice, this Note concludes that the court would
likely hold that Loi Relative au Renseignement violates France’s obligations
to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.4
1

Damian Paletta, Paris Attack Reopens U.S. Privacy vs. Security Debate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2015,
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/11/16/paris-attack-reopens-u-s-privacy-vs-security-debate/.
2
See Szuskin & Kedrida, The French Sweeping Intelligence Law Goes into Effect!,
LEXOLOGY, Aug. 4, 2015, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=694bce7d-5692-48a
b-aa50-4ce4f6eafabb.
3
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) No. 2000/C of Dec. 18, 2000, arts. 7, 8, 2010
O.J. C 364 at 10.
4
There are several avenues for potential litigants in regards to this law. One option is for
the European Commission to make a claim against France in the European Court of Justice.
Another option is for a member state of the European Union to bring a claim against France in
the European Court of Justice. Further, any member or citizen of the European Union could
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS: HISTORY, MOTIVES, AND CONSEQUENCES
A. Motive Behind the Creation of the Loi Relative au Renseignement
On January 7, 2015, two members of Al-Qaeda entered the office of the
satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, where they killed twelve people.5 The
newspaper was targeted because it had published cartoons of the Prophet
Muhammad. The incident culminated in a shootout between the Al-Qaeda
members and law enforcement. The event shocked the French public.6
Three days later, approximately 4 million people in Paris participated in a
rally of national unity.7 Within two days, the Twitter hashtag #jesuischarlie
had been tweeted over 5 million times.8 The rally and social media attention
the shooting received were seen not only as a way to support the victims’
families, but also as a unified message from the French people in support of
freedom of speech.
A few months later, in May 2015, a bill entered the French Parliament
seeking to regulate and collect data in order to combat terrorism.9 This bill
was hotly contested by the French public, with some critics referring to it as
the “French Patriot Act,” a reference to the United States’ Patriot Act that
was passed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.10 These critics claimed
the law would create a police state in France that would rival the government
in George Orwell’s 1984.11 Despite this criticism, by June 9, 2015, the
French National Assembly and Senate passed the Projet de Loi Relative au
Renseignment by an overwhelming majority.12 The law allows the French
government to monitor internet usage through complicated algorithms,
make a claim against France in the European Court of Human Rights. This paper will only
analyze the first of these options.
5
Le Resume des Faits, LE PARISIEN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://atelier.leparisien.fr/sites/Je-SuisCharlie/les-faits/le-resume-des-faits.
6
Id.
7
Remi Piet, Why Satire is Holy to the French, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 14 2015), http://www.aljaze
era.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/why-satire-holy-french-islam-2015113124829607350.html.
8
#JeSuisCharlie Tweeted More than 5 Million Times, NEW DELHI TELEVISION LIMITED
(Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/jesuischarlie-tweeted-more-than-5-milliontimes-725090.
9
French Parliament Approves New Surveillance Rules, BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORPORATION (May 6, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32587377.
10
Lawmakers Back Spy Bill Dubbed ‘French Patriot Act,’ FRANCE 24, (May 5, 2015),
http://www.france24.com/en/20150505-lawmakers-back-spy-bill-dubbed-french-patriot-act.
11
Id. See also French Lower House Passes Sweeping Security Bill Some Call Patriot Act à
la française, FREE SPEECH RADIO NEWS (May 5, 2015), http://fsrn.org/2015/05/french-lowerhouse-passes-sweeping-security-bill-some-call-patriot-act-francaise/.
12
French Senate Passes Intelligence Bill, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/french-senate-passes-intelligence-bill-1433872098.
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commonly referred to as boites noires, or “black boxes,” based on an
individual’s internet usage.13 This kind of technology is new and
sophisticated, and therefore there is not a great deal of information available.
Further, the details of the algorithm are classified, though internet service
providers (ISPs) are required to use these algorithms and make the
information readily available to French intelligence services.14
The law also allows the French government to monitor a person’s web
searches, e-mails, and mobile phone calls more intrusively than before,
without requiring permission from a judge.15 Some of the more intrusive
measures include planting cameras, microphones, and recording keystroke
logs.16 The French Prime Minister bears ultimate responsibility for
authorizing these measures. The Prime Minister is required to consult with a
new, nine-person body, known as the National Committee of Intelligence
Techniques Control, before engaging in these types of surveillance
techniques; however, he does not have to follow the Committee’s
recommendations. The panel is made up of two deputies, two senators, two
members of the Couseil d’Etat or State Council, two judges, and an
electronic communications expert.17
B. Public Backlash
Hundreds of people attended protests in France leading up to the passage
of this new law.18 Protesters claimed that the proposed vast unchecked

13
Lawmakers Back Spy Bill Dubbed ‘French Patriot Act,’ FRANCE 24 (May 5, 2015), http://
www.france24.com/en/20150505-lawmakers-back-spy-bill-dubbed-french-patriot-act.
14
Id. Another criticism of this law is that the French government is forcing ISPs to
implement automatic data-processing software that will sort through data and requiring them
to make the information acquired by the software readily available at all times. See Bertrand
Liard & Alexis Tandeau, New French Act on Intelligence Services: Impacts on Technical
Operators, WHITE & CASE TECHNOLOGY NEWSFLASH (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.whitecase.
com/publications/article/new-french-act-intelligence-services-impacts-technical-operators.
15
Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912, July 24,
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July
26, 2015, p. 12735.
16
Angelique Chrisafis, France Passes New Surveillance Law in Wake of Charlie Hebdo
Attack, THE GUARDIAN, May 5, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/franc
e-passes-new-surveillance-law-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack.
17
Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912, July 24,
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA République Française [J.O.], July 26,
2015, p. 12735 art. 831-1. For more detailed information about the structure of the French
parliament see FR. CONSTIT. Title IV arts. 24–33 (2008).
18
See French Privacy Advocates Protest New Spying Laws, RUSSIA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2015),
https://www.rt.com/news/249409-france-protest-spying-bill/.
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powers posed a threat to their civil liberties.19 Many human rights, internet
rights, and civil rights groups joined the protests. One such advocacy group,
Quadrature du Net, wrote, “Representatives of the French people have given
the Prime Minister the power to undertake massive and limitless surveillance
of the population . . . by doing so, they’re ensuring the power of the state and
the basis of our democratic system are getting ever more distant from one
another.”20 Today, when so much of an individual’s personal and business
lives are online, this message resonated with millions of French people,
despite the law receiving overwhelming support in the French parliament.
C. French Constitutional Court
The French Conseil Constitutionel, or Constitutional Court, is a body that
decides whether a proposed law will go into effect. Cases can come to the
Constitutional Court upon recommendation arranged by French officials,
including: the President; the Prime Minister; the President of the National
Assembly; the President of the Senate; a group of sixty members of the
National Assembly; a group of sixty members of the Senate; or in special
circumstances, other French courts.21 If the Constitutional Court determines
that a law violates the Constitution, the decision is binding and cannot be
appealed.22 Since the Loi Relative au Renseigment sparked so much
controversy, President François Hollande submitted it to the Constitutional
Court before it was implemented.23 The Constitutional Court upheld the law
on July 16, 2015, and it subsequently went into effect.24 However, the Court
did hold two aspects of the law unconstitutional: first, the provision allowing
surveillance by French intelligence services abroad; and second, the
provision allowing authorities to bypass the Prime Minister and the National
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control in “emergency” situations.25
The Constitutional Court was concerned that what qualified as an
“emergency” situation was not defined and could potentially result in
19

Id.
L’Assemblée nationale vote la surveillance de masse des citoyens français, LA
QUADRATURE DU NET: INTERNET ET LIBERTÉS (May 5, 2015), https://www.laquadrature.net/fr/
lassemblee-nationale-vote-la-surveillance-de-masse-des-citoyens-francais.
21
2008 FR. CONST. Title VII Art. 61.
22
Id. art. 62.
23
Emile Picy & Leigh Thomas, French Constitutional Body Approves Eavesdropping Law,
REUTERS, July 23, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-surveillance-idUSKCN0P
X2QF20150723.
24
Id.
25
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-713 DC, July 23,
2015, J.O. 0171 (Fr.).
20
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executive abuse. The French Constitutional Court upheld the rest of the law,
including both the mass collection of metadata and the utilization of the law
without the permission of a judge, even for the more serious surveillance
measures. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court was the last resort for
French citizens to voice their concerns about the Loi Relative au
Renseignement within France.
D. 13/11 Terrorist Attacks in Paris
On November 13, 2015, a terrorist group known as the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant claimed responsibility for a series of deadly assaults in
Paris that killed more than 100 people. Reports indicated that the massacre
was the deadliest attack in France since World War II.26 The assailants
directed their violence against civilian populations at a concert hall, a soccer
game, and several restaurants. After the fighting ended, France and the rest
of the world were astonished at the carnage and grief-stricken with loss. In
the following days, France launched a military bombing of the Islamic
State’s capital in Raqqa, Syria.27 France also called for a military coalition to
remove the group from power.28
France declared a state of emergency and also passed a law allowing that
state of emergency to continue until February 2016.29 This law expanded the
July 2015 Loi Relative au Renseignement, by allowing police to conduct
physical searches of electronic items like personal computers without
warrants.30 This law also allowed the government to conduct warrantless
searches of homes and cars, strictly limit organized protests, and give the
Prime Minister the power to immediately shutdown websites that are
believed to pose a public security risk.31 Due to subsequent attacks in

26
Lori Hinnant & Greg Keller, 120 Dead in Paris Attacks, Worst Since WWII, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/nationa-world/french-police-report-shoo
tout-and-explosion-in-paris/.
27
John Irish & Gregory Blachier, ‘Spider in web’ Mastermind of Paris Attacks Killed in
Raid, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/20/us-france-shooting
–idUSKCN0T22IU20151120#RowwFGMWOd5FzDct.97.
28
Id.
29
Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1995 de relative à l’état d’urgence et renforçant l’efficacité de ses
dispositions [Law 2015-912 of July 24, 2015 relating to the state of emergency and reinforcing
the effectiveness of its positions], http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/pl3225-ei.asp.
30
État d’urgence : l’État policier pour éluder tout bilan critique, QUADRATURE DU NET:
INTERNET & LIBERTÉS, Nov. 19, 2015, https://www.laquadrature.net/fr/etat-urgence-etat-polic
ier.
31
Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1995, supra note 29.
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France, the state of emergency has been extended until July 2017 after the
next national elections.32
E. European Court of Justice
After the original intelligence law went into effect in July 2015, the
political climate in Europe changed significantly. The November 2015
terrorist attacks in France further solidified fears that France is at risk of
another attack. Despite the lack of relief in the national court system, there is
still an avenue for individuals who believe that this law violates their civil
rights. Since all national resources have been exhausted, it is possible for the
European Commission to bring suit against the French government in the
European Court of Justice.
The Loi Relative au Renseignement is being discussed by the Committee
of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament (the
LIBE committee), after a request was made by members of the Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats, a transnational centrist liberal political party, in the
European Parliament.33 The LIBE committee is a standing committee
responsible for protecting the rights listed in the ECFR. Of additional
concern is whether the European Union buildings located in Strasbourg,
France, are subject to the July 2015 surveillance law, because if they are,
then the law would subject other countries’ sensitive information to French
government surveillance.34 After a thorough investigation has been
completed, the LIBE committee will determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support a claim that France has failed to meet its European
Union legal obligations as required under the ECFR. Many individuals have
legitimate concerns about public security after the terrorist attacks in Paris,
and if the LIBE committee chooses to bring a case against France for
potential violations of their obligations under European Union law, the case
could prove to be a historic opportunity for the court to show its commitment
to the protection of fundamental rights.

32
Nicolas Boring, France: State of Emergency Extended to July 2017, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/ar
ticle/france-state-of-emergency-extended-to-july-2017/.
33
French Intelligence Law: European Commission Expresses “Serious Legal Concerns,”
DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE (June 26, 2015), http://www.diplomaticintelligence.eu/european-un
ion-news/765-french-intelligence-law-european-commission-expresses-serious-legal-concerns.
34
Id. The Council of Europe and the European Parliament occupy buildings in Strasbourg.
These buildings are international in nature, and collecting information through algorithms on
world leaders in a space that is supposed to be reserved for diplomatic purposes may carry
additional legal implications.
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III. STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE LAW: FRENCH LAW AND EUROPEAN UNION
LAW
A. Loi Relative au Renseignement
After the Constitutional Court upheld this legislation, the Loi Relative au
Renseignement became law in France. Its goal is to ensure the security of
France against future terrorist threats.35 The law is designed to achieve this
goal by using algorithms that allow the government to collect and analyze
metadata through the internet. Information relating to the operation and
implementation of the algorithm will likely remain unavailable to the general
public.36 The Loi Relative au Renseignement requires that ISPs allow the
government to implement these algorithms on their networks and make the
information collected available to the government. The law specifically
says, “for the sole purpose of preventing terrorism, it may be imposed on
operators’ . . . automated processing networks, according to the parameters
specified in the authorization, to detect likely connections that can reveal a
terrorist threat.”37 A provision of the law also permits the government to use
the algorithm to collect metadata that contains confidential information of
lawyers, journalists, judges, and members of the legislature.38 This means
that all French internet users are subject to government surveillance even
without any evidence of wrongdoing on their parts.
The law also requires that a nine-person panel, the National Committee of
Intelligence Techniques Control, will be used to determine whether, based on
the results of the algorithm, a subject of surveillance may be subjected to still
more intrusive investigation.39 The Loi Relative au Renseignement states that
members of this oversight board have specified term limits, and it is designed
to ensure equal representation of men and women.40 Further, the law puts into
place a system of communication between the National Committee of
Intelligence Techniques Control and the Prime Minister.41 The oversight
35

Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912 of July 24,
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July
26, 2015, p. 12735 art. 811-2.
36
Assemblée Nationale- 2e Séance du 2015, JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], April 15, 2015, p. 4200.
37
Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912, July 24,
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July
26, 2015, p. 12735 art. 851-3.
38
Id. art. 821-7.
39
Id. art. 831-1. For more detailed information about the structure of the French parliament
see 2008 FR. CONST. Title IV art. 24-33.
40
Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015, supra note 37, art. 831-1.
41
Id. art. 833-4–833-11.

618

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 45:609

board is meant to act as a check on the Prime Minister’s power, but some find
that it lacks effective democratic and judiciary mechanisms. For example,
French anti-terrorist judge Marc Trevidic stated, “These exorbitant powers will
be without judicial review. Do not lie to [the] French by presenting this
project as an anti-terrorism law. It opens the way to widespread intrusive
methods, beyond the control of court judges, guarantors of individual freedoms
in our country.”42 The National Committee of Intelligence Techniques
Control’s lack of authority to stop the Prime Minister’s decision to conduct
more aggressive surveillance measures may present another legal issue with
regard to France’s European Union obligations.
B. European Court of Justice
If the European Commission chooses to assert a claim against France in
the European Court of Justice, the court will look to several sources of law,
jurisprudence, and legal writings in making its final determination. The
court will likely look to Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR, the legislative history
behind these Articles, and previous rulings by various European Union
courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights.
The Treaty Establishing the European Steel Community (now known as
the Treaty of Paris 1951) brought about the creation of the European Court
of Justice in 1952.43 The mission of the court is to interpret how the law
should be followed and to ensure the law is observed equally among its
treaty members.44 This court is the most powerful in the European Union,
and it has the last word on the interpretation of European Union laws.45
Since 1951, the role of the court has expanded as the European Union has
grown. The most notable of these expansions was achieved through
Flamingo Costa v. ENEL, wherein the European Court of Justice established
the supremacy of European Union law over that of its member states.46 This
allows the court to make rulings that are binding on member states, including
42
Eric Palletier, Projet de loi sur le renseignement: les réserves du juge antiterroriste Marc
Trévidic, L’EXPRESS, Mar. 19, 2015, [“Ces pouvoirs exorbitants se feront sans contrôle
judiciaire. Ne mentons pas aux Français en présentant ce projet comme une loi antiterroriste.
Il ouvre la voie à la généralisation de méthodes intrusives, hors du contrôle des juges
judiciaires, pourtant garants des libertés individuelles dans notre pays”], http://www.lex
press.fr/actualite/projet-de-loi-sur-le-renseignement-les-reserves-du-juge-antiterroriste-marc-tr
evidic_1662838.html.
43
Treaty Establishing the European Steel Community, Arts. 31–48, Apr. 15, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140.
44
Id. art. 31.
45
Id.
46
594 Case 6/64, Flamingo Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
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France, and to ensure compliance with European Union laws and treaties.
Another significant European Union Court of Justice case was Van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen.47 In this case, the
European Court of Justice held that the European Community can create
rights for European Union citizens that can be enforced by member
countries’ national courts.48 These rulings have made the court relevant in
the member state’s national legal systems and are designed to create a more
uniform system of governance among the European states.
Since the European Court of Justice is considered to be the highest court, it
can only hear cases if certain conditions are met. First, the law of the member
state must be in conflict with European Union law, and every other national
avenue must be exhausted.49 Second, there are two types of claimants who can
bring a suit to the European Court of Justice. One is the European
Commission.50 The members of European Commission are referred to as the
“guardians of the treaty,” and they are responsible for monitoring member
states to ensure compliance with the treaties of the European Union.51 The
other is another member state could bring a claim against a country it alleges
has violated European Union law. This does not happen as often, however,
due to potentially adverse political consequences.52
C. European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
The treaty that is the main focus of this Note is the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights (ECFR). As the European Union grew in membership,
one major issue the community faced was how best to consolidate the
member states’ legal systems into a harmonized regime, within which certain
personal, political, civic, economic, and social rights were protected.53 The
system previously in place was especially confusing for E.U. citizens,
because there was no uniformity among members, and people were unsure of
their rights. Consequently, member states created the ECFR in 2000, to
47
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 16.
48
Id.
49
Vaughne Miller, Taking a Complaint to the Court of Justice of the European Union,
Library House of Commons (UK) SN/IA/5397 (Mar. 11, 2010), http://researchbriefings.Parlia
ment.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05397#fullreport.
50
ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 210, 452–57 (Carolina
Academic Press 2d ed. 2013).
51
Treaty of the European Union (Consolidated Version 2012) art. 17, Dec. 13, 2007, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, 2012 O.J. (C 326).
52
LEVASSEUR ET AL., supra note 50, at 452.
53
Id.
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delineate these rights more clearly.54 The ECFR has components that
resemble a constitution, including a bill of rights and general principles for
the European Union as a political entity.55
A typical problem in a two-tiered style of government is balancing the
division of power. This stereotype held true for the European Union after the
drafting of the ECFR. Some European states expressed concern that the
power of the European Union was encroaching on national rights. After
years of debate, the ECFR became binding in 2009, when the European
Union adopted Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union.56 This treaty
states, “the provisions of this Charter are addressed to institutions, bodies and
organs of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiary and to the
member states only when they are implementing Union law.”57 In other
words, a violation of the ECFR can only be invoked when a member state is
applying E.U. law or derogating from it.58 Article 6 also gave the ECFR the
same legal force as a treaty.59
The articles of the ECFR that are most relevant to the analysis of Loi
Relative au Renseignment are Articles 7 and 8. When the European Court of
Justice is determinating the legality of the Loi Relative au Renseignement, it
will likely look to the text of these articles along with other secondary
authorities to aid in its interpretation of the law.60 In fact, the European
Court of Justice held, in its 1974 judgment in Nold v. Commission of the
European Communities, that it is “bound to draw inspiration from
constitutional traditions common to the Member States,” and that,
“international treaties for the protection of human rights, on which the
member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community
law.”61 This language leaves a lot of potential for the use of persuasive
authority that is often absent in other legal systems.

54

GIACOMO DI FEDERICO, THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: FROM DECLARATION
TO BINDING INSTRUMENT 7 (Springer 2011).
55

Id.
Treaty of the European Union (Consolidated Version 2012) art. 6, Dec. 13, 2007, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, 2012 O.J. (C 326).
57
Id. art. 51.
58
Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, 2003 E.C.R. 340.
59
Id.
60
Some of the secondary sources the European Court of Justice has used in the past include
the Commentaries of the ECFR, European Court of Human Rights decisions, and European
Parliament Directives. It is noted that the Commentaries of the ECFR and European Court of
Human Rights decisions have only persuasive value.
61
Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 00491 at 507.
56
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1. Article 7 Analysis
Article 7 requires European Union members to respect an individual’s
private and family life. Specifically, Article 7 of the ECFR states that,
“everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home,
and communications.”62 This is particularly applicable in the context of the
Loi Relative au Renseignment, which allows the government to monitor the
activities of all French internet users. This Article was written to protect
individuals from expansive government intrusion.
In 2003, the European Parliament created the European Union Network
of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (NIEFR).63
This
organization created a commentary that analyzes each article of the ECFR.
This commentary spends some time discussing the significance of the word
“communication” as used in Article 7. This word is of particular importance,
because in contrast to other human rights treaties that use more narrow
language, the creators of the Charter use the word “communication” broadly,
with the intent to adapt to changes in technology.64 Also, in comparison to
other laws used in directives or other articles of this document, Article 7 uses
expansive language, indicative of an expansive interpretation of this right.
The European Court of Justice may also look to previous case law in its
analysis of Article 7, including that of the European Court of Human Rights,
which acts as persuasive authority for these purposes. The European Court
of Human Rights is a court established by the European Convention on
Human Rights, and it rules on alleged violations of that Convention. The
European Court of Justice looks to the European Court of Human Rights
partially because it often looks to similar questions of civil, political, social,
and economic rights. The European Court of Human Rights can only hear
claims brought under the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights.65
Since the adoption of the ECFR, however, the European Court of Justice has
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frequently addressed human rights issues similar to those expressed in the
European Convention on Human Rights.66
Much of the case law suggests that the European Court of Human Rights
has broadly interpreted the right to respect for private and family life. For
example, in Lopez Ostra v. Spain, the plaintiff asserted that her privacy rights
were being violated because a government waste treatment plant was built
only a few meters from her home, which greatly diminished her quality of
life.67 In its 1994 judgment in the case, the European Court of Human Rights
ruled that severe environmental pollution, such as that caused by a waste
treatment plant, could have secondary effects which could inhibit a person’s
right to private life.68 Therefore, an individual’s privacy rights could be
violated, even through indirect means, if the government action was to
interfere with his or her personal life choices.
Another European Court of Human Rights case that presented a similar
question was Klass v. Germany.69 The case involved the German
government’s interception of phone conversations and inspections of mail,
which it said were intended to protect German democratic society from
threats to national security and other crimes. In its 1978 decision, the
European Court of Human Rights held it is sometimes necessary to conduct
investigations of individuals secretly; however, in order to determine if a law
violates an individual’s privacy rights the court must analyze, “the
circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the
possible measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the
authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and
the kind of remedy provided by the national law.”70 The court eventually
held that the German law did not constitute a violation, reasoning that, first,
there was a strict time limit for the collection and retention of personal
information, and second, the cases were subject to judicial review.71
These judgments show that although an individual’s right to privacy is
designed to be interpreted expansively, there is latitude for member states to
maneuver.
The jurisprudence also highlights the importance of
communication between a government and its citizens. These cases indicate
data collection is not necessarily an evil, so long as, first, the state clearly
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communicates how the data will be used, and second, the state provides a
proper independent mechanism for review.
The European Court of Justice could also look to Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for guidance, because
France is a party to this treaty.72 Article 17 says, “No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”73 In
other words, a government cannot indiscriminately interfere with individuals’
private lives. The 2008 General Comments, accepted by the Human Rights
Committee, say that for a government provision to not be arbitrary or
unlawful, the law must be legal, meaning it does insofar as to not violate other
international law provisions, was created to further the goals of the Covenant,
and is reasonable under the circumstances.74 The comments further state that
the law must state in detail exactly when and how the interferences will be
permitted.75 Due to the similarity in phrasing between Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 7 of the
ECFR, Article 17 may provide a useful aid in understanding an individual’s
right to privacy.76
From the cases, treaties, and commentaries, there is a general consensus
on what factors the court will likely use in determining whether the Loi
Relative au Renseignement violates Article 7 of the ECFR. These factors
will likely include the duration for which an individual is placed under
surveillance, the period of time for which the information taken from that
surveillance will be stored, the scope of the surveillance, and the overall
reasonableness of the member state’s legislation. The disputed area the court
will have to define is where states draw the line between personal freedom
and national security.
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2. Article 8 Analysis
The court may also find the Loi Relative au Renseignement violates
Article 8 of the ECFR. Article 8 states the following:
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her. Such data must be processed fairly for
specified purposes and on the basis of consent of the person
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it
rectified. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to
control by an independent authority.77
This Article was specifically created to modernize privacy rights by
protecting individuals from intrusive government monitoring. In order to
more fully grasp this Article, the European Court of Justice will likely look
at the text of the Article itself, the commentaries, European Union
Parliament’s legislation on this Article, and various case law.
NIEFR issued another comment in 2002 in response to the World Trade
Center attacks on September 11, 2001. This commentary examines the
balance needed in order to safeguard civil liberties guaranteed by the ECFR
while also protecting individuals from terrorist threats.78 In this comment, the
organization focused heavily on the criteria necessary to retain an individual’s
personal information in light of the rights guaranteed to a person by the ECFR.
Specifically, the data retention needs to be: for a specified time, for justified
grounds, and monitored by an independent control authority in order to
preserve the democratic integrity of the European Union.79
Another interpretative aid the court will likely use is European Union
Parliament legislation. The European Parliament passed Directive 95/46/EC
with the purpose of protecting European Union citizens with respect to the
processing and collecting of personal data.80 Since this directive was passed
77
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in 1995, there has been discussion in the European Union about updating the
directive because of technological advances.81 The directive says a
government needs to meet seven criteria in order to collect an individual’s
personal data: first, it must provide notice that it is collecting an individual’s
personal data; second, the collection must be for a legitimate purpose; third,
the subject of the data collection must give their consent; fourth, the data
collected must be secure; fifth, the subject of the data collection must know
who has his or her information; sixth, the subject of the data collection must
have access to their data; and seventh, any organizations violating these
principles must be held accountable.82 The directive also defines the term
“personal data” broadly, so as to afford more expansive rights. It describes
personal data as any information that can be reasonably linked to a particular
individual.83 But this directive includes exceptions in order to combat
potential threats to European Union security. Some of these exceptions
include: national security, defense, public security, prosecution of criminal
offenses, and certain economic interests of the state.84 The competing
interests between civil liberties and public security since then have been
treated like a balancing test weighed by European courts like the European
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. Although this
directive lays out factors for courts to consider, its exceptions require the
court to determine the validity of national laws on a case-by-case basis,
which can often leave room for confusion among member states.
The European Court of Human Rights addressed the issue of personal
data collection in 2000 in Rotaru v. Romania. There, a Romanian citizen
brought a claim arguing that Romania’s collection and use of his personal
data was a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.85 Some of the personal data at issue in this case included the
applicant’s political writings before the collapse of Romania’s Stalinist
government, and incorrect information which affiliated him with a violent
political group known as the Legionaries.86 Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights, similar to Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR,
indicates that everyone has a right to private life.87
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In its 2000 judgment, the European Court of Human Rights held the
Romanian law violated Article 8 because the “domestic law was not
sufficiently precise to indicate to citizens in what circumstances and on what
terms the public authorities were empowered to file information on their
private life and make use of it.”88 The court also held that the domestic law
was not specific enough in how the government will use its data collection
power, and there were not any safeguards against the potential abuse of this
power.89
The Council of Europe indicated in both the ECFR and the European
Convention on Human Rights that widespread and unchecked surveillance
can become a governmental tool for oppression. Considering Europe’s
history of communism and fascism in the early twentieth century, this
concern is legitimate. The judgment in Rotaru v. Romania indicated that in
order to make a data-collection law legal, the state must include certain
precautions to ensure the rights of European Union citizens are protected.
One of these precautions is a clear message of what information is being
collected and how it will be used by the member state’s government. Failing
to meet these requirements would be unjust, because it would render the data
collection process completely arbitrary. This could potentially result in a
state where everyone is subject to punishment for political, economic, or
cultural views.90 Further, the court emphasized the value of proper
safeguards to ensure the purpose declared in the state law is being
followed.91 Without proper checks on government authority, there is little
assurance that the data collection is being used legitimately.
The court will also likely look to Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of
Communications.92 In this European Court of Justice 2004 action, the Irish
High Court and the Austrian Constitutional Court asked for a preliminary
ruling on Directive 2006/24 created by the European Parliament. Directive
2006/24 was created in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
in the United States. The directive allowed governments to collect data on an
unlimited number of people and to store that data for an extended period of
time, with the stated purpose of combating the threat posed by global
terrorism.93 The European Court of Justice found that the directive interfered
with the European Union citizen’s right to protection of their personal data
88
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under Article 8 of the ECFR.94 It also analyzed whether this directive met a
public security exception. As mentioned previously, if a state is implementing
a data-collection policy designed to counter crimes like terrorism, there is
more flexibility in the ECFR. The court found the law in question did meet an
exception, because the directive protected a legitimate interest: an individual’s
right to security, which is also protected by the ECFR.95
The next issue the court analyzed in its judgment in Digital Rights Ireland
was whether the law was a proportional response to the security interest in
light of Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR. In this part of the opinion, the court
analyzed to what degree the law was an acceptable way to achieve its purpose
and whether the methods it implemented were necessary. The court wrote that
considering the seriousness of the violation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter,
the standard should be strict.96 The court held that the generalized surveillance
measures allowed in this directive were not necessary, because the surveillance
measures did not require a link between the criminal activity that they were
monitoring and the subject of the surveillance.97
This generalized
governmental surveillance could not be allowed because it essentially put
everyone in the European Union under the microscope of the government.
Further, the court held, there were improper safety mechanisms in place to
ensure the data would be used for a legitimate purpose.98
This case indicates that member states have the ability to create policies
to protect their vital security interests, but that those interests must be
weighed against the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the
ECFR. Some elements to consider in this test are the seriousness of the
threat posed, on the one hand, and the extent to which individual freedoms
will be compromised, on the other. The judgment in Digital Rights Ireland,
in particular, suggests the number of individuals being surveilled by the
government is important in determining whether the data collection is unfair
and arbitrary. Thus, when there are more people placed under surveillance
there must also be a greater security interest.
3. Margin of Appreciation Analysis
The margin of appreciation doctrine allows states to have room to
maneuver when it comes to developing state policy in order to implement
European Union laws. Specifically, the Council of Europe stated in an
94
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Explanatory Report on Protocol that, “State Parties enjoy a margin of
appreciation in how they apply and implement the Convention, depending on
the circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms engaged.”99 This
doctrine was originally used in the European Court of Human Rights, but the
European Court of Justice has also since adopted it.100 There is often conflict
when a two-tiered system is implemented between the state governments and
the federation of states as a whole. In the case of the European Union, a
source of tension between the community and the member states is that the
community wants to develop a more uniform system of laws and regulations
while states want to retain their sovereignty. The margin of appreciation
doctrine offers a potential solution to this problem.
Some areas of the law allow more flexibility than others. These include
public emergency, national security, protection of public morals, and
legislative implementation of social and economic policies.101 States also
have more leeway when there is no universal consensus within the European
Union, or if a state is trying to balance two competing rights.102 The margin
of appreciation doctrine is more open to these kinds of policies because
certain regulations are sometimes necessary for security reasons that ensure
the survival of the state. Also, states might be better qualified to make
certain kinds of legislation because they are in “direct, continuous contact
with the realities of the country” and can more accurately strike a balance
between social needs.103 When the European Court of Justice has to make
rulings on whether or not a state policy violates European Union law it will
likely analyze whether it fits into one of these categories.
Other kinds of state laws have a narrower margin of appreciation.
Examples include when a person’s identity or existence is at stake, a person’s
absolute rights are compromised, a law promotes racial or ethnic
discrimination, or a law seeks to regulate an “intimate aspect of private
life.”104 In these cases, the European courts are much less flexible because
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there is a strong interest in promoting policy that guarantees the greatest
amount of personal freedom and that protects individuals from those in
power who may want to take advantage of political, ethnic, and racial
minorities. The analysis becomes more complicated, however, when there
are two fundamental rights directly at odds with each other.
IV. DISCUSSION: EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE INQUIRY
This Note will next discuss how the European Court of Justice might rule
if the Loi Relative au Renseignement was brought before it, considering the
jurisprudence and the facts of this particular case. The first part of this
section will analyze whether the Loi Relative au Renseignement violates
Article 7 of the ECFR. The second part will discuss whether or not it
violates Article 8. After looking at the facts of the case and the applicable
law, the European Court of Justice will probably find this law violates
Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR. So, the third part of the discussion will try to
determine if the law meets any of the enumerated exceptions in Articles 7
and 8. Finally, the fourth part will analyze whether the margin of
appreciation doctrine provides enough latitude for the French government to
keep their law even though it conflicts with the European Union obligations.
A. Does the French Law Violate Article 7?
Article 7 indicates that every individual has a right to private life. This
right to not be interfered with has been the subject of a great deal of litigation
and analysis.105 If the European Commission were to bring a claim against
France in the European Court of Justice, the Commission would likely claim
that France had violated its obligations to be in compliance with the ECFR
under Article 7. France would probably argue that this law is specific
enough and has adequate safeguards to avoid violation. When determining
whether the Loi Relative au Renseignement encroaches upon an individual’s
right to private life, special consideration must be given to the jurisprudence.
1. Arbitrary use of Surveillance
If the European Commission chooses to bring a suit against France to the
European Court of Justice, the Commission will claim the Loi Relative au
Renseignement violates Article 7 in several ways. One of these is that
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running all metadata used by French citizens through algorithms without
discrimination is an interference with private life because personal
information is being collected arbitrarily. The Commission will contend that
screening the entirety of the French population to search for a fraction of the
minority of persons who may attack the state is unfair in that it will force the
rest of internet users to be subject to expansive police powers. Although
certain qualifications must be met to further analyze the collected metadata,
the collection of such information in the first place is an interference with the
French population’s privacy rights, and there is no way to check the power of
French intelligence agencies.
The French government could argue this law does impose certain limits
on the collected data. It might also assert that the collection of metadata
alone should not be considered an interference with a person’s fundamental
rights, because simply holding the information for a specific period of time
does not prevent the subject of the surveillance from accessing the
information. Nor does the law allow intelligence services to use the data.
Further, France will probably say that the complex algorithms do initially
screen all of the data, but this information is not used unless certain
qualifications are met. So, the search for information relating to a potential
terrorist threat is not arbitrary.
In Klass v. Germany the European Court of Human Rights held the
German government could collect data of a German citizen because there
was a judicial measure in place that checked the power of intelligence
agencies.106 France will probably say in the case of the Loi Relative au
Renseignement, all metadata is put through an algorithm without judicial
discretion or control, but there are checks on more invasive measures of data
collection because the National Committee of Intelligence Techniques
Control reviews cases and gives a recommendation on an individual basis.107
Further, the Prime Minister acts as a final check because he makes the final
decision as to whether more invasive measures will be implemented.108
The European Court of Justice will probably find that the widespread
collection of metadata for the purpose of putting it through an algorithm
conflicts with an individual’s right to a private life. Metadata alone may not
necessarily give a lay-person enough data to link the information to an
individual, but the information in metadata can be easily processed by an
intelligence agency in order to reveal personal data that links directly to an
106
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individual.109 Since the information is being collected from all internet users
in France and not only individuals who are suspected of committing criminal
offenses, it seems to be an over inclusive policy that is only going to capture
a small segment of the population while jeopardizing most people’s
individual liberties.
2. Lack of Governmental Transparency
The European Commission also might claim that there is no limit to how
much information is being collected on an individual subject of surveillance.
This results in uncertainty among internet users, and necessarily interferes
with their private lives. Since only specific members of French intelligence
agencies know how the algorithm works or what makes a French internet
user subject to more intrusive measures of surveillance, the Loi Relative au
Renseignement could discourage people from making statements that could
be interpreted as against the French government. This kind of unregulated
authority could end in a violation of a person’s privacy rights, especially if a
person may be subject to government monitoring for comments made in the
private sphere.
The government might reply to this claim by saying that the algorithms
used to screen the metadata are advanced and complex, and are designed to
determine whether a surveillance subject’s internet usage indicates that he or
she would be a terrorist threat.110 So, the fear that French intelligence
services will use this power to quash political dissidents is not valid.
This question will be particularly difficult for the European Court of Justice
because the issue of whether an algorithm that detects signs of terrorist
sentiment is a sufficient measure of security has never been presented to the
European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights before.
The European Court of Justice, in its 2014 judgment in Digital Rights Ireland
Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, did hold that widespread surveillance of a
population without checks on government power violates the individual’s right
to privacy.111 But, the European Court of Human Rights in its 1978 judgment
Klass and Others v. Germany determined that in other instances a government
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can collect more intimate data if there is just cause and proper evidence to
support a more detailed investigation.112
Despite the arguments on both sides, the European Court of Justice will
most likely find that these algorithms are not an appropriate measure to
protect individuals from government intrusion into the privacy rights
guaranteed by the ECFR. One of the main issues the European Court of
Justice will have is that no one with actual independent authority can control
the actions of the Prime Minister.113 The French government could actually
be screening for anything, and there is no governmental check on the
intelligence agencies who are collecting data. Some of the information
analyzed could be completely irrelevant to the prevention of terrorism.
Another reason why the European Court of Justice may find these
algorithms to be an ineffective protection is because the algorithm, which is
designed to act as a screen, does not actually protect an individual until after
their metadata has already been collected and analyzed. One could argue
there is an inherent violation of an individual’s right to privacy, however,
simply from the mere collection and storage of the data.114
3. Adequate Safeguards
The Commission should argue that the security measures that have been
implemented to prevent the abuse of this authority are too few and lack
transparency. Unlike surveillance laws in other countries, which require
permission from a judge before engaging in what are arguably more intrusive
surveillance practices, this law requires only the permission of the Prime
Minister.115 Further, although there are two judges on the National
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control, their opinions are neither
binding nor enforceable and do not provide an effective check on the Prime
Minister’s authority.
The French government could reply by saying the Constitutional Court has
already taken these concerns into account and has required the Prime Minister
to seek the opinion of the National Committee of Intelligence Techniques
Control before making a determination about engaging in more serious
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surveillance measures.116 Another argument the French government could
make is that the Prime Minister is elected by the people, and the democratic
process is a powerful check on the abuse of authority. In short, if the people
do not want to have this law, they should go through democratic means to get
it removed. Since the Prime Minister and the people’s elected representatives
in Parliament overwhelmingly support this piece of legislation, the European
Union should respect the decisions of the French government.
The European Court of Justice will probably find the lack of oversight is
the greatest weakness in the Loi Relative au Renseignement. Although the
French government can make several compelling arguments, the National
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control’s lack of enforcement power
and the absence of any judicial authority could allow arbitrary abuse of an
individual’s right to privacy. Also, democracy is a powerful tool in ensuring
people have an avenue to participate in government, but the democratic
process is not perfect. So, individuals need an independent judiciary to
protect the rights of people who may not be in the majority.
B. Does the French Law Violate Article 8?
The next issue the European Court of Justice will have to analyze is
whether the Loi Relative au Renseignement is in violation of Article 8 of the
ECFR. Article 8 says everyone has a right to protection of personal data, and
that data has to be processed fairly for specific purposes on the basis of
consent or a legitimate law.117 Also, people have a right to access data
collected and a right to have incorrect data rectified.118
The major issue the European Court of Justice will have to analyze in
regard to the Loi Relative au Renseignement is this law’s procedure. Article
8’s primary focus is on the process by which the data is collected.119 The
court has held previously and research suggests that data can be collected in
vast amounts if the process is fair and there are adequate safeguards to
prevent abuse.120 The European Court of Justice will likely find that this vast
data collection, without discrimination, is not a fair process of surveillance,
and this law violates Article 8 of the ECFR.
116

Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-713 DC, July 23,
2015, J.O. 0171 (Fr.).
117
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) No. 2000/C of December 18, 2000, art. 8,
2010 O.J. (C 364) 10.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
E.U. Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, at 95 (2000), http://ec.0000000europa.
eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf.

634

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 45:609

1. Right of Access
The right of access to one’s personal data is specifically mentioned in
Article 8(2) of the ECFR.121 The right to know one’s data is being processed
and the right to challenge the validity of the government’s collections of data
is an integral part of the right to protection of personal data.
The Commission will likely argue a major issue with the French law is
that the process of mass surveillance is not fair because the information is
being processed without the knowledge or consent of the subjects of
surveillance. The law does not provide any avenues for French citizens to
know what data is being collected or put through the government’s
algorithm. The European Commission may use the holding of the European
Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of Communications
by arguing that the court paid special attention to the fact the subjects of
surveillance themselves would not be aware they were being analyzed by
intelligence agencies and therefore could not argue to any legitimate
authority that their data was being processed unfairly or without cause.122
Without such knowledge, individuals do not have a legitimate way to defend
themselves if the government decides to implement more intrusive
surveillance measures.
The French government will likely reply by arguing that the law was
originally designed to combat terrorism.123 Allowing everyone to know what
data is being collected and when an individual is subject to more intrusive
surveillance measures would undermine the purpose of the law. If people
could bring claims against the French government, potential terrorists would
eventually learn how to conduct their illegal activities around the protection
of the algorithm. The more information there is available about how the
French government conducts their secret surveillance, the more likely it
would be that terrorist threats could exploit this information to hurt French
citizens. Further, there is an avenue where a person can simply request
information about whether the National Committee of Intelligence
Techniques Control has engaged in intrusive methods on a person
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individually.124 Although this does not allow for instant right of access, a
person does still have an avenue to seek redress.
2. Specificity
The Commission could also argue that the data is not being collected for
specific purposes and does not allow for any sort of exceptions. For
example, the law does not allow exceptions for journalists who may have
private information about anonymous sources.125 This information will also
be collected and potentially analyzed without discernment from other data.126
Another example of the lack of discrimination is potential communications
between clients and their attorneys.127 As technology has progressed, many
lawyers have turned to the internet to communicate more efficiently with
their clients.
This law potentially puts confidential attorney-client
communications in the government’s possession. In the case of the Loi
Relative au Renseignement, these potentially confidential discussions will
also be subject to the surveillance law and can be monitored by the
government without the consent of surveillance subjects. This is a violation
of a person’s rights under Article 8 because the law is not specific enough to
take these especially serious privacy concerns into account.128 The generality
of the surveillance law subjects individuals to arbitrary enforcement;
therefore, it violates Article 8 of the Charter.
The French government could respond to this argument in several ways.
They could claim the collection of metadata is a nominal invasion of privacy
rights because the data will not be used unless they meet certain
qualifications required by the algorithm. Further, by using an algorithm as a
specific discriminatory filter, intelligence services are prevented from
engaging in unfair surveillance practices. In short, the French government is
directly targeting potential terrorist threats from metadata.
The French government can also argue that metadata is a specific type of
data, and this targeted approach shows the government’s intent to only look
124
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at certain data for a specific reason. Metadata is a description of actual data,
and metadata alone does not tell an individual much unless they are
processed to the point where they actually recreate what is essentially a copy
of a person’s personal data.129 The French government is not going to be
putting raw data together unless: first, the algorithm indicates the subject of
surveillance is a potential threat to the French people; second, the National
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control gives an opinion on whether
more serious surveillance methods should be used; and third, the Prime
Minister renders a final decision that, based off the data collected, an
individual poses a terrorist threat.
The European Court of Justice will probably find this to be one of the
more difficult issues to analyze, but in the end, it should find the collection
and processing of metadata does violate Article 8. The use of metadata for
security purposes is a relatively new phenomenon in comparison to more
traditional methods of surveillance such as wiretaps, videotaping, and even
hacking into individual’s computers to read e-mails. The European Court of
Justice may take a new approach and find metadata is too unsophisticated to
be considered in the same category as personal data. Although having access
to an individual’s metadata creates the potential for state abuse, this potential
may not become a reality, because the law indicates that metadata will
exclusively be used for the purpose of stopping terrorism.130
By accepting this argument, the European Court of Justice would have to
overcome the logic that it utilized in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of
Communications, when it held that the storage of metadata did violate an
individual’s privacy rights because it allowed for the potential to create
personal data.131 This indicates that metadata can be considered personal
data in that they can be used to link raw information to a particular
individual. Even though the algorithm acts as a filter, simply having access
to data capable of being manifested into information that can be directed at
an individual in particular is still a violation of Article 8.
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3. Independent Authority
Article 8(3) of the ECFR says compliance with Article 8 by an independent
authority is also a fundamental right.132 Accordingly, another argument the
European Commission could make is that the National Committee of
Intelligence Techniques Control is not an independent authority that controls
the French government’s surveillance. Although the French law does try to
ensure the board is independent by taking actions such as term limits,
proportional representation based off of political parties and gender, and
ensuring two judges are on the panels at all times, the Loi Relative au
Renseignement fails to give the National Committee of Intelligence
Techniques Control any authority in the surveillance decisions.133
When it comes to this argument, France would have difficulty trying to
convince the European Court of Justice that a capable independent body
exists to control the government’s use of surveillance, as required in Article
8(3) of the ECFR. Therefore, at this point France may have to turn to some
of the exceptions that are indicated in Directive 95/46/EC.
C. Does the Law Meet any Exceptions?
Directive 95/46/EC provides that under certain circumstances a
government can be allowed to collect an individual’s personal data and
infringe on an individual’s right to privacy. These exceptions include
national security purposes, defense, public security, prosecution of criminal
offenses, and certain economic interests of the state.134 In order to use these
exceptions to justify infringement on an individual’s personal rights,
however, the government must balance the interests of the state and of the
individual when creating laws. If the European Court of Justice does hear a
claim brought by the European Commission, the court will have to
implement this balancing test.
France will argue that the Loi Relative au Renseignement is designed to
combat a real and active terrorist threat that puts the country’s citizens in
danger. The law specifically states that it is designed to prevent terrorist
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attacks on government institutions and the French public.135 It is also
designed to prevent organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.136 The goal of the law is focused and designed to prevent
harm to French citizens. So, the French government is justified in
implementing the contents of this law in order to keep the French people safe
from this mounting threat.
France will likely claim that in this past year France has experienced a
rise in terrorist attacks, and France is perpetually exposed to radical
individuals who threaten the French way of life.137 After the Charlie Hebdo
attacks of January 2015 there was another terrorist attack on November 13,
2015. The latter was the deadliest yet, resulting in over a hundred civilian
casualties. The original threat that was used as justification to pass the Loi
Relative au Renseignement has manifested into a reality that will forever
change how France addresses terrorism.
The issue of modern terrorism causes concerns for France because the
internet is now being used by terrorist organizations like the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant to recruit cyberjihadists from around the world.138 The
French government could further state that the fight against terrorism is
unique and requires a different method of defense than traditional armed
conflicts. Unlike conflicts between countries, the conflict between terrorist
organizations and the French public does not involve formal military units.
In this case, terrorists can be people who have no military experience, living
seemingly innocuous lives.
The nature of this kind of conflict makes it difficult for governments to
detect threats before they happen. It is also more severe than traditional armed
conflict because the intended targets of terrorist attacks are civilians, and the
individual terrorists often reside, in some capacity, in the state they wish to
attack. Consequently, more innovative measures, like the ones implemented in
the Loi Relative au Renseignement, are necessary to thwart the plots of
individuals who are determined to put an end to the French way of life.
France can also argue that it did take into account individual liberties,
because France recognizes that implementing new security measures often
135
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calls for reassurance by the government that this new power will be curtailed
by procedural and judicial safeguards. One of the measures the French
government has taken is forbidding the government from monitoring French
people with regard to politics, public debate, and the media.139 The law also
allows French people to seek redress through the French court system if they
believe the surveillance measures used on their personal data were
unjustified.140 In short, France would answer by drawing attention to the fact
that the Loi Relative au Renseignement does seek to strike a balance in the
freedom versus security dilemma that has plagued democracies since their
inceptions.
France will likely say that it did take individual liberty interests into
account when creating this law, but in this case because the security interest
is so serious, an individual’s liberty interest must make some space to allow
for protection of the public welfare. The rise of technology has pressured
governments to take more serious measures to protect their citizens, and
perhaps using the technology—for instance by the use of algorithms—is the
best way to combat the technology used to perpetuate violence.
It seems unlikely that the European Commission will bring a case against
the government of France considering how recent the 13/11 terrorist attacks
took place. Further, the European Commission may have a stronger
argument for removing the Loi Relative au Renseignment if it waits until
after France is no longer in a state of emergency. Regardless of when the
European Commission brings suit, it will have compelling arguments
regarding the disproportionate effects on law abiding citizens and the lack of
safeguards of this law.
The European Commission will respond by acknowledging that the
security concern is a legitimate interest, but that France’s method of
combatting terrorism has a disproportionate effect on the French public, one
that renders the law unjustifiable and violates Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR.
Although there are exceptions to Directive 95/46/EC, these exceptions must
be weighed against, and only implemented in light of, the seven principles
needed to collect an individual’s personal data. These seven principles are:
there must be notice of collection of personal data, the collection must be for
a legitimate purpose, the subject of data must give their consent, the data
collected should be secure, the subject of collection should know who has his
or her information, the subject should also have access to their data, and any
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organizations violating these principles should be held accountable.141 The
European Commission will argue that the French government failed to
balance these seven principles. The law does not give the subject of the
surveillance notice of collection of data when the government implements
more intrusive surveillance measures. Although the subject of the collection
can appeal the surveillance measures, the subject would have no reason to
believe the government is implementing these more serious measures unless
the person was able to discover this on his or her own.142 A grave
shortcoming of the Loi Relative au Renseignement is that the law does not
seem to mitigate this notification principle.
Also, the law does not ask for the surveillance subject’s consent before
processing that person’s data. This expansive government policy collects all
French internet users’ data, and then the Prime Minister determines if
additional surveillance techniques need to be applied. The French
government could argue that it had the consent of the people to create this
law democratically. This would not be a compelling argument because of
the public opposition, and one cannot get consent to violate an individual’s
fundamental rights through a representative in the legislature.
The European Commission will also argue that a major flaw of this law is
that there are several principles that are not addressed. The law fails to discuss
how it will ensure that the data collected will be secured or what agencies will
have access to the data besides the Prime Minister and the National Committee
of Intelligence Techniques Control.143 These failures to legislate particularities
in regard to these principles call into question the fairness of a law that
proposes searching for a small minority of people who may be potential
internet using terrorists by monitoring the French public indiscriminately.
The lack of judicial control over the Prime Minister’s decisions gives him
control over a large amount of data with no check on his authority. The Loi
Relative au Renseignement indicates that the Prime Minister can exclusively
use the information gathered through the algorithms in order to combat
terrorist threats, but if the Prime Minister chooses to use this information for
more illegitimate purposes there is no system in place to hold him
accountable.144
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The National Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control is an
ineffective group to hold the Prime Minister accountable or limit the scope of
the surveillance techniques because its decisions have no binding authority.
Further, the decisions of the Prime Minster and the recommendations of the
National Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control are considered state
secrets. According to the law the French people are required to receive a
yearly report in which the National Committee of Intelligence Techniques
Control reveals how many times the more serious surveillance techniques are
used by intelligence services.145 The law fails in specificity because there is
never any disclosure of who the techniques were used upon, what evidence
was used to determine these additional measures were necessary, or whether
the use of these techniques were implemented for political motivations.146
The European Commission will likely argue that the lack of effective
judicial safeguards makes this law in violation of the ECFR, even when the
public and national security exception is brought into play. The threat of
terrorism is a part of governance; all governments are potential targets of
terrorist attacks, and the risk of terrorism is a part of ruling and living in
modern society. This threat cannot be used as a justification to forgo the
foundations of the European Union, and cannot be used to compromise the
fundamental freedoms of privacy and protection of personal data.
D. Will the Law be Upheld under the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine?
At this point the European Court of Justice will likely have to conduct a
margin of appreciation analysis. The margin of appreciation doctrine allows
members of the European Union to have some latitude when it comes to
developing state policy in order to implement European Union laws.147 As
mentioned previously, the European courts often allow for a wide margin of
appreciation under certain circumstances. France will likely say it should
have a larger margin of appreciation because the Loi Relative au
Renseignement was created for national security purposes.148 The European
Commission will probably reply by saying the court should use a narrower
margin of appreciation because the law compromises a person’s absolute
rights and seeks to regulate an intimate aspect of private life.149
In the end, their arguments will still come down to one issue: whether the
Loi Relative au Renseignement encroaches on the fundamental rights
145
146
147
148
149

Id. art. 833-9.
Id.
GRUSZCZYNSKI & WERNER, supra note 101, at 240–42.
Id.
Id.

642

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 45:609

guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR beyond what is permitted under
the margin of appreciation doctrine to violate France’s obligations under the
ECFR. All things considered, the European Court of Justice will likely find
that even with the margin of appreciation as a means for more flexibility with
member states, there are still insufficient safeguards to protect French
citizens’ fundamental rights. The previously mentioned case law indicates
that if there is a clear communication of how the data will be used, and there
is a proper independent mechanism for review, then it will likely not violate
a member state’s obligations to the European Union.
The European Court of Justice may consider offering suggestions to the
French government on how to mitigate the Loi Relative au Renseignement’s
encroachment on civil liberties. One way the court could do this would be by
suggesting that the French government make the National Committee of
Intelligence Techniques Control a body that can make binding decision
regarding whether surveillance techniques should be increased. The French
law has a lot of details to ensure that this body is independent. The committee
requires the equal representation of men and women, it includes two judges,
and the members have specific term limits.150 It even includes a person who is
an expert in electronic communications.151 These facts seem to indicate that
this committee is qualified to make decisions independently, and perhaps they
should be given more substantive authority to act as a check on the Prime
Minister’s authority. This body could act as a judicial authority which could
afford citizens protection for their fundamental rights because there is some
additional safeguard in managing their personal information.152
Another recommendation the European Court of Justice could offer is to
reprogram the algorithm to consider extremely private information, such as
conversations between lawyers and their clients, doctors and their patients,
and journalists and their sources. The makeup of the algorithm is highly
sophisticated and largely unknown. But, perhaps an additional safeguard for
personal data would be to simply redesign a part of the algorithm so as to
exclude the processing and collecting of this kind of information. This
150
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would allow French citizens to have greater solace, knowing some personal
information cannot be collected or used by the French government.
Finally, the European Court of Justice could advise France not to
implement its system of mass surveillance, and only use the algorithm to
collect an individual’s metadata if there is other evidence to suggest this
individual poses a terrorist threat. The French government is unlikely to
favor this option, which would allow it to conduct surveillance measures on a
small segment of the population. France would argue this would not afford
any additional protection beyond the bounds of law before the
implementation of the Loi Relative au Renseignement.
V. CONCLUSION
Balancing interests of freedom and security has been an ongoing issue in
democracies, and it only gets more complicated with the advent of modern
technology. The Loi Relative au Renseignement illustrates this dilemma.
With the recent attacks on French citizens, it is not surprising that the French
government feels pressure to protect its people. It is clear some action must
be taken in order to protect individuals from terrorist attacks while also
staying true to the democratic and individualistic values that formed the
foundations of the modern French government.
The European Court of Justice will likely be equally concerned with
maintaining the balance between freedom and security. Considering all of
the external resources, however, the court will likely find that the Loi
Relative au Renseignement comes into significant conflict with the ECFR.
The text of Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR, as well as the subsequent case law,
suggest a broad interpretation of the rights that these Articles offer.
Another tool the court can use to help make its decision in regard to this
law is the legislation passed by the European Union. These documents lay
out specific criteria in which data can be taken, stored, and used. They also
talk about under which circumstances the government can collect
information without following the recommended criteria.
Finally, the European Court of Justice will use cases decided by the
European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights
holds special value to the European Court of Justice, and their decisions
should guide the European Court of Justice to the conclusion that France
should take additional steps to mitigate the negative effects on its citizens’
fundamental rights in order to bring France into compliance with its
European Union obligations.

